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states on the basis of populafion, 5 were botched provisions. They were either intended to have no significance, apart from compromising with slavery, or, in
the alternative, were so defective that they had to be
discarded as unworkable. The Supreme Court's 1796
decision in Hylton v. United States 6 effectively gutted
the clauses, and, for Johnson, that was a good thing.
When the Court in 1895 reinvigorated the clauses in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 7 by striking down
an unapportioned income tax, it made a horrible mistake, says Johnson. The 1913 ratification of the 16th
Amendment, which exempted "taxes on incomes" from
apportionment, put the tax world back where it had
been before the Supreme Court screwed things up in
Pollock - with the Direct-Tax Clauses playing no significant role - or so the argument goes.

I appreciate Professor Johnson's
candor about the nature of his project,
but 'manipulative expansion' isn't an
acceptable method of constitutional
interpretation.
At bottom, what all of this means to Professor
Johnson is that, in evaluating the legitimacy of an unapportioned tax today, we should go back to the understanding of the Hylton justices, under which nothing
but a capitation tax or a tax on real estate should be
subject to apportionment. 8 And, if there's any doubt
about the appropriate result in a particular case,
Johnson urges us to use "manipulative expansion" of

5

See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included
within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons.
See also U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census
or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."). Apportionment therefore means that a state with, say, one-twentieth of the national population must bear one-twentieth of
the aggregate liability associated with any direct tax, regardless of the state's percentage of the national tax base.
6
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
7
157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding unapportioned tax on income
from real estate unconstitutional); 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (extending principle to income from personal property and
rejecting entire 1894 tax).
8
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (Chase, J.); id. at 183 (Iredell,
J.); id. at 177 (Paterson, J.); see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. Given what Johnson says about wealth taxes,
he must think that even a tax on real estate is no longer
subject to apportionment. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 172829 and 1733; infra Part III.B; see also Calvin H. Johnson, "Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the
Constitution," 7 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 1, 70 (1998) ("Even
considering land tax a 'direct tax' makes the apportionment
requirement contrary to the more general intent.").
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constitutional terms to ensure that apportionment isn't
required. 9
I appreciate Professor Johnson's candor about the
nature of his project, but "manipulative expansion"
isn't an acceptable method of constitutional interpretation. In rebutting Johnson, I'll rri.ake several points.
First, I briefly explicate my own position, which
Johnson niischaracterizes: He makes me appear even
crazier than I really am by overstating the extent to
which I believe the Constitution might preclude national taxes on consumption. Second, I argue that his
version of the original understanding of the Direct-Tax
Clauses gives those clauses way too little scope. Finally, I challenge his characterization of what the 16th
Amendment did to the Direct-Tax Clauses. Among
other things, I conclude that a direct-consumption tax
and a tax on wealth should both be subject to the apportionment requirement today.
I. Direct Taxation and the 16th Amendment

According to Professor Johnson, I argue that "Congress may not tax wealth and may not adopt a national
sales or consumption tax," 10 at least not unless Congress apportions the tax. Or, as the synopsis of
Johnson's article puts it, my position is supposedly that
a "federal tax on consumption, sales or wealth would
not be constitutional because the 16th Amendment allows only a tax on 'income/ without apportionment of
the tax among the states." 11
That's only partly right, and it's a quite misleading
characterization of my views. Because everyone concedes that the Direct-Tax Clauses were intended to
apply to national taxes on real estate, I have little doubt
that a wealth tax would be subject to the apportionment rule, as originally understood/ 2 and it also
wouldn't be a "tax on incomes" exempted by the 16th
Amendment from apportionment. 13 But Johnson is
wrong about the extent to which I think the Direct-Tax
Clauses prohibit consumption taxes.
Taxes on consumption are subject to apportionment
only to the extent that they are direct taxes, and the
classic consumption tax, one imposed on the transfer
of articles of consumption- including what we would
today call a sales tax - was precisely the sort of tax
the Founders understood to be indirect. 14 The Founders
assumed that the burden of indirect taxes was shifted
to the ultimate purchaser of the goods, and indirect

9
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1734; see infra notes 89-90 and
accompanying text.
10
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1723.

llJd.
12

See infra Part III.B.l.
See infra Part III.B.2.
14
The indirect taxes are the "Duties, Imposts and Excises"
subject to the uniformity rule. See supra note 3. I concluded
that an unapportioned sales tax or VAT would be constitutional in Erik M. Jensen, "The Apportionment of 'Direct
Taxes': Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?" 97 Colum. L.
Rev. 2334, 2405-07 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Apportionment], excerpted in Tax Notes, Nov. 2, 1998, p. 611.
13
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taxes could therefore be avoided: If you don't want to
pay the tax, you can buy an untaxed good instead. With
this built-in protection against governmental over:eaching, in~ire.ct taxes required no special limitations
In the Conshtuhon. 15 If a consumption tax isn't a direct
tax to begin with, apportionment isn't required, and
we needn't worry about whether the tax is covered by
the 16th Amendment.16
What I. have argued is that taxes on consumption
that are dzrect taxes, but aren't taxes on incomes, continue to be subject to the apportionment requirement.
As a resulti certain direct-consumption taxes (the flat
tax and the USA tax proposed in the 1990s, for example)
c~uld have constitutional problems. They would be
duect taxes, as I understand the original meaning of
the Direct-Tax Clauses; 17 they couldn't be apportioned
and do what they are intended to do; 18 and, because
the direct-consumption taxes would remove the
sa_vings componen! from the income tax base, they
might well not be taxes on incomes" as the drafters
and ratifiers understood the 16th Amendment. 19 At a
minimum, it would be foolhardy for Congress to
proceed on the assumption that an unapportioned
direct-consumption tax is automatically constitutional.
Professor Johnson is right that the importance of my
argument about the meaning of the 16th Amendment
- that consumption taxes and income taxes were
un~erstood to be fundamentally different types of
levies, and that a consumption tax is not a "tax on
incomes" 20 - is dependent on the proposition that Pollock was rightly decided in 1895. If, instead, the category of direct taxes includes nothing but capitation and
real-estate taxes (as suggested by several justices in
Hylton, decided in 1796 21 ), then Pollock was wrong; the

15
In generat if a government overdoes an indirect tax, revenue actually drops because people stop buying the taxed
goods, or otherwise take steps to avoid the tax. As a result,
there's no incentive for the government to abuse its authority.
16
To be valid, such a levy need only be geographically
uniform. See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1; see supra note 3.
I have had some second thoughts about my conclusion
~ha~ a national sales tax or VAT would necessarily be an
mdirect tax, see supra note 14, at least insofar as the tax might
be broad-based. The Founders conceived of the relatively
benign indirect taxes (excises, imposts, and duties), those
that could be avoided, as being targeted at particular goods,
where substitutes were available. If a sales or value-added
tax were levied on most consumer goods, however, so that
avoidance would be difficult, the tax wouldn't fit so well
with the Founders' conception of an indirect tax. See Jensen,
Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1085 n.131. I'm still inclined to
vi~w a nati~nal sale~ tax or VAT as indirect, but my uncertamty level IS now h1gh on this question.
17
•
See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2407-08;
mfra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
18
See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2404.
19
See id. at 2408-14; Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at
1129-46; infra Part liLA.
20
See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1091-1129; infra
Part liLA.
21
See infra note 76.
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16th Amendment was unnecessary'tb permit .an unapportioned income tax; and the meaning of "taxes on
incomes" in the Amendment doesn't matter. 22 If an
income tax··isn't. a direct tax, then the proposed directconsumption taxes also presumably wouldn't be direct
taxes. End .of analysis.
But that analysis is wrong atevery step. In the next
part, I explain how Professor Johnson's conception of
the original meaning of the Direct-Tax Clauses is much
too narrow and why, therefore, the Pollock Court
properly concluded that an income tax is a direct tax.

II, The Direct-Tax Clauses
Most Fom,1ders feared a national taxing power. They
wanted to strengthen the minimal taxing power that
had existed under the Articles of Confederation, to be
sure, but they also wanted to keep that power under
check. Limitations on the taxing power weren't afterthoug~ts at the Philadelphia Convention, and one of
those limitations was the apportionment rule for direct
taxes.
·
First, let me torch a couple of Professor Johnson's
straw men (or, as we now say in the academy, people
of stra\-\r). By quoting a number of Founders about the
importance of direct taxation, Johnson implies that I
think direct taxation is forbidden by the Constitution.
For example, he writes that "Washington's stubborn
refusal to allow anything that goes to the prevention
of direct taxati"on represents the Founders' intent." 23
Fine, but that's beside the point. I've never suggested
that direct taxation isn't permissible; indeed, no one
suggests that.
It's one thing to conclude, as Professor Johnson
properly does, that Congress can impose direct taxes.
It's quite another to jump to the conclusion that the
Founders constructed a system under which d1rect
t~xation was to be unconstrained, and that~ the apportiOnment rule - a part of the Constitution, after all - is,
and always was, a nullity. 24

22
0r at least it doesn't matter much. If the term "taxes on
incomes"includes a wealth tax, as Professor Johnson suggests
that it does, see Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733, then an unapportioned national tax on real estate would presumably be
constitutional, despite the original understanding that such a
tax is a direct tax. See infra Part III.B.2.
23
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1728.
24
Professor Johnson devotes a fair amount of attention to
the Direct-Tax Clauses' unfortunate connection with slavery.
(Slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a person for
purposes of apportioning direct-tax liability among the
states, just as slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a
person for representation in the House of Representatives.
See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3, quoted in supra note 5.) As
does Bruce Ackerman, Johnson seems to suggest that the
slavery taint is justification for ignoring the apportionment
rule. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1724-25 and 1734; Bruce
Ackerman, "Taxes imd the Constitution," 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
58 (1998). While it's obviously true that the limitation on
direct taxation took the form it did because of slavery, there's
no reason to think that the Constitution would have been
(Footnote 24 continued on the next page.)
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A second, related straw person of Professor
Johnson's: I'm apparently supposed to concede that,
because the Federalists "won" the battles on taxation
in Philadelphia and the state ratifying conventions, the
direct taxing power was. unlimited. 25 Baseball and the
Constitution are both fundamental to American
society, but writing a Constitution isn't like a ball
game, an ali-or-nothing contest- with one clear winner and one clear loser. In Constitution writing, as in
politics generally, "winners" seldom achieve all of their
goals.
Of course the Federalists were more successful than
the Anti-Federalists - they were winners in that important respect - and direct taxation was unquestionably intended to be among the powers of Congress.
(No one, I repeat, doubts that the Federalists prevailed
on that point.) But, when it came to taxation, the
Federalists didn't get what they wanted in an undiluted form. For one prominent example, the
Federalists generally opposed the Export Clause,
which prevents Congress from taxing "Articles exported,"26 but the Clause wound up in the Constitution
anyway: there would have been no Constitution
without it. 27 And, for that matter, not all Federalists
thought the taxing power should be unconstrained; 28
even the strongest proponents of a powerful national
government didn't suggest in public that the government could do anything to raise revenue. 29 To say that
the Federalists "won" isn't to say that the taxing power
is limitless.
One of Johnson's primary points, which draws force
from opinions in Hylton v. United States, 30 is that apportionment fell by the wayside quickly because "[a]pportionment of direct tax turned out to be a rule too silly

silent about direct taxation if slavery hadn't existed. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2385; Jensen, Taxing
Power, supra note 1, at 1074.
25
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1727.
26
See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 5; supra note 4. Among
the opponents of a limitation on the national government's
power to tax exports were Founders Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, Governeur Morris, George Washington, and
James Wilson- a formidable group. See Erik M. Jensen, "The
Export Clause," 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 7-16 (2003) [hereinafter
Jensen, Export Clause].
27
See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 26, at 6-16.
28
The views of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison,
for example, weren't even close to being identical. Madison
thought the direct-tax apportionment rule was "one of the
safeguards of the Constitution." 4 Annals of Cong. 730 (1794)
(describing why he was voting against an unapportioned
carriage tax, the constitutionality of which was later at issue
in Hylton).
29
Whatever he thought in his heart of hearts, Alexander
Hamilton didn't argtJ.e that the national taxing power was
limitless when he was trying to get the Constitution ratified.
See, e,g., The Federalist No. 36, at 220 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("An actual census or enumeration of the people must
furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts the
door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of
[real-estate] taxation seems to have been provided against
with guarded circumspection.").
30
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
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to enforce, in those cases in which the tax base is not
equal per capita among the states." 31 If t0e tax base ,
isn't distributed equally, rates will have to differ
among the states, or some other compensating mechanism will be required to satisfy the apportionment rule.
And, just like the justices in Hylton, Professor Johnson
can easily come up with examples to make apportioned
taxes look ridiculous. 32
The problem with the Johnson formulation, even as
buttressed by Hylton, however, should be apparent.
Professor Johnson is saying nothing more than that
apportionment should be required only when it makes
no difference, when the tax at issue is already automatically apportioned. You "enforce" the rule only
when there's nothing to enforce. That's not the statement of a rule; it's the obliteration of a rule. It's like
saying that the rule prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures should be invoked only to analyze
reasonable searches and seizures. 33 Even imperfect provisions, if that's what the Direct-Tax Clauses are,
should be interpreted in as robust a way as possible. 34
And there is a reasonable way to interpret the DirectTax Clauses so that they have effect. The clauses are
written as if they are limitations on the taxing power,
and that's how they should be understood. The clauses
make it difficult (not impossible, but difficult) to impose direct taxes. Professor Johnson correctly assumes
that having different tax rates in different states -

31

Johnson, supra note 1, at 1725; id. at 1734 ("Apportionment
is a silly and hobbling requirement, as the Founders recognized in Hylton, when the tax base is uneven."). In Hylton,
Justice Chase had written that
[t]he Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as
direct taxes, but only such as Congress could lay in
proportion to the census. The rule of apportionment is
only to be adopted in such cases, where it can reasonably apply; and the subject taxed, must ever determine
the application of the rule.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174. Justice Iredell agreed: "As all
direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident, that the constitution contemplated none as direct, but such as could be
apportioned. If this [carriage tax] cannot be apportioned, it
is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the constitution."
Id. at 181.
32
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1725 (arguing, for example,
that, if apportionment were required with a carriage tax like
that in Hylton, "the poor fool to drive the first carriage into
Kentucky would have to bear Kentucky's entire state quota").
33
Professor Johnson somehow thinks that a 17th century
English case, where a court refused to enforce a contractual
i:erm because, as Johnson puts it, the term was "too silly to
enforce," is relevant in constitutional interpretation. Id. at
1725 (discussing James v. Morgan, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (1658)).
Constitutional terms do get in the way - that's the point,
isn't it? - and it's a bit much to suggest they should be
disregarded when they become inconvenient.
34
.
Professor Johnson approvingly quotes Alexander
Hamilton's argument in Hylton: "[N]o construction ought to
prevail calculated to defeat the express and necessary authority of the government." Id. at 1726. That's true in a way, I
suppose, but you can'ttell what the Founders thought the
necessary authority of the government was without considering the express limitations built into the Constitution.
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something that might happen if the apportionment rule
is applicable - is generally going to be seen as an
absurdity, but he then concludes that the rule is therefore an absurdity. Quite the contrary. It's because the
rule might lead to facially suspect results Mississippi's citizens, say, subjected to taxation at
higher rates than Connecticut's - that the rule has
effect.

Professor Johnson's parade of
horribles won't start its march down
Broadway because the political
process will generally ensure that his
absurd apportionment scenarios won't
occur.
Professor Johnson's parade of horribles won't start
its march down Broadway because the political
process, operating in the shadow of the apportionment
rule, will generally ensure that his absurd apportionment scenarios won't occur. If Congress is inclined to
use direct taxes in the first place (and the Founders
didn't think the United States would have to rely on
direct taxation in the ordinary course of its business35 ),
the apportionment rule pushes Congress in the direction of implementing only those levies with uniformly
distributed bases - "equal per capita among the
states," 36 to use Professor Johnson's phrase. The fear
that taxation might be used to cripple one section of
the country was pervasive at the Constitutional Convention, 37 and, in ordinary situations, the apportionment rule makes enactment of a blatantly sectional tax
unlikely.
If the base of a proposed direct tax is "equal per
capita among the states," the tax, by definition, will
satisfy the apportionment rule, and it will be relatively
easy to justify politically. There's no arguable element
of sectional preference (that is, one set of states ganging
up to disproportionately tax another set of states). Congressmen from Mississippi and Connecticut can
evaluate the proposed tax on the merits, without worrying about sectional disparities.
If the proposed tax base is not "equal per capita
among the states," however - presumably the usual
situation- selling the tax to Congress is going to be
much more difficult, and rightly so. For example, imagine a proposed tax on dogsleds 38 that would be
nominally uniform~ the same rate would apply in all
parts of the United States 39 - but, without apportionment, the negative effects of the tax would clearly be
disproportionately felt in Alaska and other northern
states. Mississippi congressmen who aren't otherwise

35

See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2382-83.
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1725.
37
That concern was behind the Export Clause, see Jensen,
Export Clause, supra note 26, at 7-16, and it was also clearly
one of the reasons justifying the uniformity rule.
38
Hey, I get to use my absurd examples, too.
39
That's all the uniformity rule requires. See supra note 3.
36
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concerned about the fairness of the tax base might well
be enthusiastic about a tax burden that would be borne
entirely, or almost entirely, by someone else. If the
dogsled tax is considered direct, however, the apportionment rule would require that Mississippi citizens
also bear a proportionate share of the total tax burden
(measured by Mississippi's percentage of the national
population) - that is, the tax could no longer be uniform40 - and the enthusiasm of Mississippi congressmen (and others similarly situated) for the tax
would be substantially lessened.
Another example: Imagine for a moment that we
have no 16th Amendment, and that there's still controversy about whether an income tax must be apportioned. (And remember that, in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, many viewed the personal income tax
as sectional, just like my hypothetical dogsled tax. 41 )
Professor Johnson thinks it's horrible that, if an income
tax would have to be apportioned~ the rates applicable
to citizens of Mississippi would have to be much higher
than those applicable to citizens of Connecticut. 42 And
I agree that the result would be grossly unfair to Mississippians, if such an apportioned tax were actually
enacted. 43
But Johnson's argument again misses the point: The
existence of the apportionment rule makes enactment
of an apportioned income tax unlikely. Mississippi con-

40
The uniformity rule and the apportionment rule are
mutually exclusive: A levy is governed by one or the other,
but not both. When a tax must be apportioned, it is generally
going to be the case that it can't be uniform as well. See Jensen,
Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2341-42.
41
As the 19th century waned, the appeal of the income tax
to populists and other firebrands was that it would disproportionately hit the industrial Northeast, where the
greatest wealth and the highest incomes were concentrated.
(A very high exemption amount made the tax applicable only
to very-high-income persons.) See Jensen, Taxing Power,
supra note 1, at 1102-06. Indeed, some opponents of the income tax claimed that it violated the uniformity clause because it was so clearly sectionally based. That argument
failed: The rates were uniform throughout the country, and
that's all that the uniformity rule requires. See supra note 3;
Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1065-66. BU:t the income
tax was no less sectional just because it was "uniform."
42
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1725.
43
0f course, not everything that is arguably unfair is unconstitutional. Professor Johnson assumes that, if I think apportionment should be taken seriously;. I must approve of
absurdly different tax rates in different states. But just because I think a rule would operate in a particular way in a
particular hypothetical situation- assuming that a bizarrely
apportioned tax could be enacted in the first place - doesn't
mean that I would approve of those hypothetical results.
For what it's worth, I'd prefer that citizens of Mississippi
and Connecticut pay federal taxes at the same rates. If I were
a congressman, I'd generally· vote against taxes that would
have to be apportioned, and, if a direct tax other than an
income tax somehow became necessary - to raise funds in
an emergency such as wartime - the apportionment rule
might well lead to results that I'd prefer not to see. But what
Professor Johnson or I think about the desirability of
geographically variable rates doesn't define the boundaries
of constitutional principles.
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gressmen aren't going to support a tax that requires
higher-than-average tax rates in their jurisdiction, nor
will congressmen from the other poorer states. As a
general matter, the apportionment rule removes the
incentive for states with a disproportionately small
percentage of a particular direct-tax base from pushing
for a tax that, without apportionment, would disproportionately burden other states. Furthermore, the
need to apportion makes the sectional nature of the
legislation transparent. If different rates will be applicable in different states, that will make it more difficult for anyone to support the tax. One hopes that
congressmen generally- even those from Connecticut
(and Texas?) ~ would balk at the imposition of an
income tax with geographically variable rates. 44
As a result, except in emergencies, when revenueraising needs may trump other concerns, political pressures will keep Congress from enacting a tax with
markedly sectional effects. 45 In the ordinary course,
Congress will either not rely on direct taxes at all or
will impose direct taxes only on tax bases that are
"equal per capita among the states" - or close to it.
One might disagree with the goal of limiting congressional power,46 or be indifferent to the purported
dangers of sectional taxation, or find fault with the way
the apportionment rule implements its goals in a particular case. But the enterprise isn't "too silly to enforce."47
Despite the good sense at the core of the apportionment rule, Professor Johnson would have us defer to
the dicta of the Federalist justices in Hylton. If Justice

44
The Supreme Court recognized the practical political.difficulties of apportioning certain taxes in one of the cases Cited
by Professor Johnson: "[N]o Congress would dare to apportion, for instance, the income tax." Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23
Wall.) 331, 343 (1875), quoted in Johnson, supra note 1, at 1728.
The corollary is that, if the income tax has to be apportioned,
there is unlikely to be an income tax, except in times of national emergency.
45
Assuming that the apportionment requirement is satisfied, a direct tax can be imposed at any time. But the
Founders assumed that direct taxation would be used only
in wartime and other emergency situations. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2382-83.
46
Professor Johnson's conception of the apportionment
rule gets the constitutional scheme upside down. He wants
the rule to apply only when the tax base is uniformly distributed, when, by definition, there's no danger of sectional
taxation. And he wants the rule to have no application to
cases in which nominally uniform taxes have sectionally disproportionate effects.
47
Professor Johnson is right that apportionment, if actually
applied to a particular tax, could hurt the poorer states -he
uses an apportioned income tax as an example, see Johnson,
supra note 1, at 1725 n,17- but it could help them as well.
How it would work depends on what it is that would be
taxed. If you're trying to imagine a worst-case scenario, you
might imagine Congress, in a world without apportionment,
targeting relatively poor southern states with a nominally
uniform, but sectionally based, direct tax - maybe a tax on
land used to grow cotton. Apportionment makes a sectionally
targeted direct tax unlikely, whether aimed at richer states or
poorer ones.
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Iredell said that, "[a]s all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident, that the constitution contemplated
none as direct, but such as could be apportioned," 48 his
statement is supposed to be gospel. Iredell and friends
were Founders - "giants [who] walked upon the
Earth," 49 in Johnson's pnrase- and "[t]hey knew the
Constitution far better than we do." 50
Well, maybe yes, maybe no. 51 Certainly all Founders
didn't interpret constitutional provisions in the same
way.s 2 And the Hylton Court was a Federalist Court: It
viewed its function as propping up, rather than checking, the Federalist government. 53 As time went on, and
the Federalists were losing their grip on power, their
positions were less and less constrained by. consti~
tional dictates. It was early Congresses - filled with
Johnson's "giants"- that gave us the Alien and Sedition Acts and other constitutional outrages. 54
As Justice Souter explained in another context, in
rejecting use of the founding generation's behavio~ as
a necessarily determinative method of discerning
original understanding, "[P]ublic officials, no matter
when they serve, can turn a blind eye to constitutional
principle." 55 It generally isn't a good idea to rely on
those in power to define the limits of their power, and
we ought to be particularly skeptical of Founders'
statements that, if given controlling weight, would
have the effect of gutting constitutional provisions. 56
If we take off our 21st century hats, and try to put
ourselves back into the 18th century, it should be obvious how counterintuitive the Johnson position is. 57
Imagine Calvin Johnson, who had been prominent at

48
49

Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 181 (Iredell, J.).
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1726.

SOJd.
51
It's not at all clear that we're at a scholarly disadvantage
today. We have available many primary sources that most
members of the founding generation were unaware of. Besides, they didn't have computers.
52
See supra note 28.
53
See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1079 n.115.
54
If I remember my fairy tales and operas correctly, giants
often weren't the good guys. See Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66,
1 Stat. 577 ("An Act respecting Alien Enemies"); Act of July
14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 ("An Act in addition to the act,
entitled 'An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against
the United States"). Similarly, a 1797 tax statute blatantly
ignored the Export Clause. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra
note26, at 21-25 (discussing Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, sectwn
1, 1 Stat. 527); U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 5.
55
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616 n.3 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
56
I don't mean to suggest that the views of Federalist officials, including Hylton justices, are irrelevant in trying to
discern original understanding. The views of the Hylton justices are relevant data, to be evaluated in context, but they
shouldn't be taken as automatically controlling.
57
I£ Professor Johnson wants to argue that original understanding is irrelevant, or impossible to discern, that's one
thing. (I generally disagree with that proposition, but it's
commonly advanced in constitutional analysis.) That doesn't
seem to be Johnson's position, however. If it were, what

(Footnote 57 continued on the next page.)
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the Philadelphia convention in 1787, speaking on behalf of the Constitution before the Texas ratifying convention. 58 (Welt of course Texas should have been one
of the 13 colonies.) When asked whether the Constitution imposes· any serious limitation on the national
government's power to tax, delegate Johnson answers,
"No, certainly not. This is a pro-tax document." When
asked if the Constitution would permit the national
government to impose an unapportioned tax on the
personal incomes of American citizens and residents,
delegate Johnson responds, "Absolutely! I've never
heard of such a tax, but nothing in the Constitution
would prevent it. Moreover, the Constitution also
won't limit any other new methods of taxation that our
descendants can think of."
Say what? With those interpretations of the DirectTax Clauses, the Texas convention wouldn't have voted
to ratify the Constitution. 59 If there had been such a
general understanding of the national powers created
in Philadelphia (whether or not an imaginary Texas
colony was involved), we wouldn't have had a Constitution (or this article). Peculiar though the direct-tax
apportionment rule may have been in form, it was
intended to be a hobble on the national taxing power.
Which leads to the question of how we should
evaluate forms of taxation that were unknown in 1787,
like the income tax. In their discussions of direct taxation, the Founders generally expressed concern about
capitation taxes and real estate taxes (the two categories specifically mentioned by Hylton justices as direct
taxes), and (obviously) they couldn't have talked about
forms of taxation that hadn't yet been devised. Professor Johnson suggests that, if the Founders weren't
specific in limiting or prohibiting a particular form of
taxation, that form can be imposed today without
restriction (other than requiring that the levy be
geographically uniform).
How strange! It would be a peculiar Constitution
indeed that governed only the specific sorts of behavior
that could have been contemplated in 1787, but that's
exactly the sort of position that Professor Johnson is
promoting. It's like interpreting the Fourth Amendment as having no application to electronic surveillance.
The Constitution ought instead to be interpreted in
a way that gives weight to its provisions. I've described
what I see as the proper way to interpret the meaning
of "direct taxes" in a couple of articles. 60 In summary
form, it goes something like this: Taxes are either indirect or direct. The indirect taxes, generally those im-

posed on transfers of articles of consumption, were
considered safe enough to leave in the hands of the
national government, without constraints other than
the uniformity rule. 61 The taxes that aren't indirectthose that don't have the built-in protections against
governmental abuse that are characteristic of indirect
· taxes - were intended to be difficult to impose. In
short, if a tax isn't an indirect tax (or after the ratification of the 16th Amendment, a "tax on incomes"), then
it's subject to apportionment.
The personal income tax doesn't have the characteristics of the classic indirect taxes, and it therefore
ought to have been treated as a direct tax. The Pollock
Court thus got the result right: Until the 16th Amendment came along, an income tax should have been
subject to the apportionment rule. 62 And the Pollock
Court was right that the conception of "direct taxes"
reflected in the opinions in Hylton v. United States, in
1796, was much too narrow;
When the 16th Amendment did come along, it merely provided that "taxes on incomes" need not be apportioned. I'll next consider what the Amendment did
to the scope of the Direct-Tax Clauses more generally.

III. The 16th Amendment
With my understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses
and the validity of Pollock, the 16th Amendment was
essential if Congress was going to have the power to
enact an unapportioned income tax. In this part of the
article, I consider the scope of the Amendment and
respond to Professor Johnson's arguments that the
Amendment was unnecessary and that Congress has
the power to enact an unapportioned tax on wealth.

A. The Amendment and Pollock
If the Direct-Tax Clauses mean little or nothing, as
Professor Johnson argues, then the 16th Amendment
was indeed superfluous. And Johnson characterizes
the move to the Amendment as nothing but a tactical
maneuver. Most Amendment supporters, Johnson argues, thought Pollock was so clearly wrong that the
Amendment was, as a technical matter, surplusage.
The problem was that the votes weren't there to go
ahead with a new income tax unless the Constitution
was amended first. 63 In Johnson's view, the Amendment merely made it politically possible to get a new
income tax on the books, and the Amendment
shouldn't be interpreted as a validation of the result in
Pollock.

61

Johns~m has to say about original understanding also
wouldn't matter- a good thing, perhaps, but obviously not
what he has in mind.
58
I've used this thought experiment before, with another
target. See Erik M. Jensen, "Taxation and the Constitution:
How to Read the Direct-Tax Clauses," 15 J. L. & Pol. 687, 687
(1999) [hereinafter, Jensen, Taxation].
59
Indeed, I doubt that today's Texas would vote to ratify
such a document.
60
See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 14, at 2393-97;
Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1073-77.
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See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
I don't want to defend everything in the Pollock
majority's opinions. When it comes to reactionary views, I'm
hard to embarrass, but there's still a lot in Pollock that embarrasses me. Nevertheless, wretched excess doesn't mean
that the Court got the result wrong.
63
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1731-33. Some income-tax
supporters were nervous about offending the Supreme
Court, for example. And, even if the Court had been absolutely wrong in Pollock, there was no guarantee that the Court
would get it right the next time, unless the Constitution was
changed. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1109-14.
62
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A preliminary point: Why congressmen in the late
19th and early 20th centuries should be treated as
definitive interpreters of the Direct-Tax Clauses isn't
apparent. Although Johnson is correct that some supporters thought the Amendment was substantively unnecessary, it's not as though they were obviously right
on that point. 64 Those congressmen weren't going back
to first principles. They were merely restating what had
become the conventional wisdom before Pollock, and,
not coincidentally, arguing that congressional power
should be unconstrained. And, even if we assume that
Congress can define constitutionality by majority vote,
it's not clear that the Pollock-skeptics in Congress outnumbered their opponents.

With my understanding of the
Direct-Tax Clauses and the validity of
Pollock, the 16th Amendment was
essential if Congress was going to
have the power to enact an
unapportioned income tax.
But let's assume arguendo that we should care about
how Congress in 1909 understood Pollock, and that
Congress had some special power to validate or invalidate the result in that case. With that understanding, Professor Johnson follows Professor Bruce
Ackerman in arguing that Congress carefully crafted
the resolution that became the 16th Amendment so as
to indicate no acceptance of Pollock's expansive conception of direct taxes. 65 Congress did this, the argument
goes, so that after ratification of the Amendment, the
law would revert to its pre-Pollock form -,with the
Supreme Court's 1796 decision in Hylton as the controlling understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses.
If there were evidence to support that proposition,
it might well affect how we interpret the scope of the
Amendment today. 66 But there's no evidence whatsoever that the language of the 16th Amendment was
selected to repudiate the understanding of Pollock (except in the most obvious way, of course, by making it
possible to have a tax on incomes without apportionment).67 Maybe Pollock's expansive conception of what
constitutes a direct tax has fallen by the wayside
anyway, 68 but, if that's happened, it's not because of
64

See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1107-14.
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733; Ackerman, supra note 24,
at 1117-20.
66
lt wouldn't have to have that effect. We might still conclude that, whatever Congress thought, the Court had gotten
it right in Pollock. But Congress's view would probably (inevitably?) play some role in how we understand the vitality
of Pollock.
67
See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1091-1129 (dis-·
cussing this point at mindnumbing length).
68
By "expansive" I mean as compared to the conventional
wisdom before Pollock, when the assumption was that the
Court had gotten it right in Hylton. As compared to original
understanding properly interpreted, however, the Pollock
Court's conclusion was not at all expansive.
65
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anything the drafters did in fashioning the
Amendment's language.
The final language of the Amendment wasn't hammered out on the floors of the Houses of Congress, with
recorded debates to guiqe us as to what was happening
(and from which Johnson and Ackerman might derive
support). The language was drafted in closed sessions
of the Senate Finance Committee - the all-but-final
version of the resolution made its first public appearance fully formed- and the committee was controlled by Pollock-friendly Republicans and chaired by
Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, no fan of the
income tax. 69 The argument that these folks were trying
to come up with language to undercut Pollock's broad
rationale is, quite simply, incredible.
And the language changes that occurred along the
way can't bear the weight that Johnson and Ackerman
would impose on them. The final language of the
Amendment - "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration"70 - is silent about Pollock. It exempts one category of taxes from apportionment, nothing more; it
certainly reflects no clear attempt to undercut a broad
reading of Pollock and thus to reinvigorate Hylton. Furthermore, as I argue at the margin, the fact that the
Finance Committee removed a reference to "direct
taxes" in the language of a draft resolution, something
stressed by Professor Johnson, actually undercuts his
position. 71
In any event, if my understanding of the Direct-Tax
Clauses is correct, the Amendment was essential to
make an unapportioned income tax possible. If that's
so, then the meaning of the term "taxes on incomes" is

69

See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1119.
U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
71
Johnson thinks it's significant that Senator Norris
Brown's original language was rejected: "Congress shall have
power to lay and collect direct taxes on incomes without
apportionment among the several States according to
population." Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733 (quoting S.J.R. 25,
61st Cong., 1st Sess., 44 Cong. Rec. 1568 (Apr. 28, 1909)). As
finalized, the Amendment makes no specific reference to
direct taxation. See supra text accompanying note 70. According to Johnson, "[t]he change, rejecting Brown's language, is
relevant evidence that Congress, in proposing the amendment, did not mean to treat the income tax as direct, and did
not mean to make taxes that fell just outside the definition
of income, as taxes that failed for want of apportionment."
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733.
I don't see it. If anything, the language change points in
the opposite direction. The original Brown language suggests
that there may be some income taxes that aren't direct (i.e.,
there are "direct taxes on incomes" but also therefore indirect
taxes on incomes). Contrary to Professor Johnson's argument, if a congressman wanted to make it clear that Pollock
was rightly decided, that an income tax is ipso facto a direct
tax, he would have wanted to change the Brown language.
Why not therefore read the final version of the Amendment
as a vindication of Pollock? See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra
note 1, at 1120.
70
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critical in determining what direct taxes were, and
what direct taxes weren't, exempted from the apportionment requirement by the Amendment.
The term used in the Amendment is "taxes on incomes," which doesn't come close to supporting the
proposition that the pre-Pollock understanding was to
be resuscitated or, more broadly, that all direct taxes
are exempted from apportionment. The determination
of what constitutes a "tax on incomes" should be informed, I've argued, by the debates that led to the
adoption of the 1894 income tax, and, after the Supreme
Court struck down that tax as unconstitutional, by the
process that culminated in the 16th Amendment.
Those debates make it clear that the proponents of
an income tax, and the proponents of the Amendment,
saw income taxes and consumption taxes as fundamentally different. 72 Before the modern income tax came
into being, the national government relied almost entirely for revenue on consumption taxes (tariffs and
excises), which had increasingly come to be seen as
unfair. The whole point of the push for income taxation, culminating in the 16th Amendment, was to
rechannel the national government's historical reliance
on consumption taxes, not to validate new, direct forms
of consumption taxes.
The 16th Amendment was intended to make it possible to enact an income tax without apportioning the
tax. That's what it did, and that's all it did. (That was
quite enough, thank you very much.) Any tax that is a
direct tax but that isn't a tax on incomes remains subject to the apportionment rule. I've argued that a directconsumption tax is one example of a tax that must be
apportioned, and I'll now argue that another such levy
is a tax on wealth.

B. Taxes on Wealth
As I understapd him, Professor Johnson generally is
arguing that the 16th Amendment reestablished the
pre-Pollock understanding of direct taxation. But at
times he seems to go further: He seems to be suggesting
that the Amendment eliminated the direct-tax concept
as a matter of constitutionallaw. 73 That's the only way
to make sense of his argument that an unapportioned
wealth tax is a constitutionally permissible levy.
There are two possible ways to conclude that an
unapportioned tax on wealth would be constitutional.
One is that a wealth tax isn't a direct tax, and the
second is that, even if a wealth tax is a direct tax, it is
also a "tax on incomes" and therefore removed from
the apportionment rule by the 16th Amendment. Both
possibilities fail, as I'll now demonstrate.
1. Wealth taxes as direct taxes. Professor Johnson argues that wealth taxes weren't considered direct taxes
by the Founders, and that an unapportioned tax on
wealth would therefore be permissible today, even-

72
I marshaled a seemingly endless series of quotations in
support of that proposition in Jensen, Taxing Power, supra
note 1, at 1100-02 and 1124-26.
73
Except perhaps for capitation taxes, which, if imposed
at the same rate on all "heads," are automatically apportioned anyway.
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if I correctly understand his argument - without the
16th Amendment. 74
That isn't a position that can be reconciled with any
conception of original understanding. It's true, as
Johnson argues, that the Founders understood that
taxation of wealth was intended to be within congressional power. 75 (All direct taxes were within Congress's
power.) But everyone, including the justices in Hylton,
conceded that a tax on real estate (the quintessential
tax on wealth in 1787) would be a direct tax. 76 Congress
thus could impose a wealth tax, but, to do so, it would
have to apportion the tax. And Congress in fact did just
that several times between 1798 and 1861 by enacting
apportioned national taxes on real estate. 77

Professor Johnson can't have it both
ways - citing Hylton as the correct
product of 'giants' when it stands for a
proposition he likes and then ignoring
the same 'giants' when they say
something he disapproves of.
Professor Johnson can't have it both ways- citing
Hylton as the incontrovertibly correct product of
"giants" when it stands for a proposition he likes (that
apportionment should be required only when it makes
no difference 78 ) and then ignoring the same "giants"
when they say something he disapproves of (that an
unapportioned tax on wealth is a direct tax). 79 If

74

See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1728-29.
See id.
76
In Justice Chase's words, the direct taxes "contemplated
by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll
tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other
circumstance; and a tax on LAND." Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at
175 (Chase, J.). Justice Iredell agreed: "In regard to other
articles, there may possibly be considerable doubt." Id. at 183.
And, while Justice Paterson was unwilling to concede that
no other taxes could be direct taxes, he too concluded that
capitation and real-estate taxes were the "principal" examples of direct taxes: "I never entertained a doubt, that the
principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers of
the Constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of
apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land." Id.
at 177.
77
See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292; Act of Mar.
5, 1816, ch. 24, 3 Stat. 255; Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60, 3 Stat.
216; Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, 3 Stat. 164; Act of Aug. 2, 1813,
ch. 37, 3 Stat. 53; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597.
78
See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
79
Moreover, in the cases between Hylton and Pollock that
Johnson concludes got the Direct-Tax Clauses right, holding
that the clauses didn't limit the taxes at issue, the Supreme
Court assumed that a real-estate tax is a direct tax. See, e.g.,
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) ("[D]irect
taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real
estate .... "); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 348 (1875)
75

(Footnote 79 continued on the next page.)
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Johnson's case for an unapportioned wealth tax
depends on the understanding in 1787, it's a loser. 80
2. Wealth taxes as income taxes. To be sure, Johnson
has a backup position - that whatever the understanding of a wealth tax in 1787, the 16th Amendment
removed such a tax from the apportionment requirement. And he can quote congressmen who, during
debates on the 1894 income tax and, later on, during
debates on the resolution that became the 16th Amendment, characterized the modern income tax as an attack
on concentrations of wealth. 81 As I've argued elsewhere, however, those congressmen were talking about
imposing taxes on the wealthy through an income tax,
not about levying taxes measured by the value of the
wealth itself. Although the language used in floor
debates may have occasionally been imprecise, hardly
anyone was suggesting thatthe 16th Amenqment
would be authority for the imposition of an unappor.;.
tioned ad valorem tax on wealth. 82 Why would· congressmen have bothered with such a broader point,
which could only have complicated the prospects of
ratification? Getting authority for an unapportipned
income tax represented an extraordinary expansion of
the national revenue power as it was; the need for still
other forms of taxation wasn't apparent at the time
(and it's not apparent now either, for that matter).

I

We can argue about which interpretive
principles should be given the greatest
weight, but hitting the 'delete' key
shouldn't be one of them.

There simply isn't evidence to support the' proposition that the Amendment was intended to do away
with the apportionment rule for direct taxes other than
taxes on incomes. Professor Johnson throws in the
obligatory quotation from Justice Holmes's 1920 dissent in Eisner v. Macomber 83 - "Holmes ... showed his
wisdom by saying that '[t]he known purpose of this
amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what

(characterizing estate tax on real estate as excise on passage
of value, as distinguished from tax on ownership of real
estate, which would have been direct); Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 543 (1869) (noting that direct taxes
imposed to that time had all been on real estate, and that
"personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, have
never been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct
tax").
80
ln another article Johnson relies on the concept of a
"more general intent" of the Founders to support the
proposition that a tax on real estate shouldn't be treated as
a direct tax, even though the Founders said, to a man, that
they thought such a tax was governed by the apportionment
rule. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 70. I see no reason even to
look for a "more general intent" on an issue about which we
have absolutely no doubt: The Founders thought a tax on real
estate was a direct tax.
81
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1733.
82
1 have a fuller discussion of this point in Jensen, Taxing
Power, supra note 1, at 1128-29.
83
252 u.s. 189 (1920).
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might be direct taxes"' 84 - but Holmes provided no
evidence or authority to support his understanding of
the "known purposeu of the Amendment. 85 · He provided no evidence or autbority because there was none.
What was "known" in the privacy of Justice
Holmes's study isn't always of help in legal analysis, 86
and most of Justice Holmes's colleagues, on the 1920
Court didn't share his understanding of what for them,
too, was recent history. Holmes was just wrong. At
several points in its deliberations, the Senate had explicitly considered, and rejected, proposals to convert
the Amendment into a full-fledged repeal of the DirectTax Clauses. Such a step would really have eliminated
those "nice questions" about meaning - indeed,
Senator Anselm McLaurin of Mississippi urged doing
away with the Direct-Tax Clauses for precisely that
reason - but nothing like that happenedP
A conscious decision was made to limit the 16th
Amendment's scope to "taxes on incomes." All that the
Amendment did - all that it was intended to do ..;_
was to make an unapportioned income tax possible.
IV. Conclusion
The apportionment rule was intended to constrain
national power, but, for practical purposes, Professor
Johnson's conclusion that the Direct-Tax Clauses no
longer have effect may well be right. If that's so, however, it's because too much has happened to reclaim
the original constitutional rules- and, of course, because the 16th Amendment dramatically reduced the
need to even consider other possible revenue sources
- not because principled constitutional analysis requires such a result. 88
As with the interpretation of other constitutional,
statutory,. and regulatory provisions, understanding
the Direct-Tax Clauses and the 16th Amendment requires close analysis of language, purpose, structure,
and ·history. We can argue about which interpretive
principles should be given the greatest weight, but
hitting the "delete" key shouldn't be one of them.
Hitting "delete" is nevertheless what Professor
Johnson urges us to do with the Direct-Tax Clauses. He
favors "manipulative expansion" of terms to circumvent the inconveniences of the direct-tax apportion-

84
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1734 (quoting Macomber, 252 U.S.
at 219-20 (Holmes, }.,dissenting)).
85
See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1061; see also
Jensen, Taxation, supra note 58, at 711.
86
Justice Holmes also "knew" that "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
87
See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1120-21 (discussing unsuccessful amendments by Senator McLaurin).
88
If a tax on wealth, say, withstands constitutional analysis
today, it has to be because our constitutional understanding
has changed, not because the position is consistent with
original understanding. For Professor Ackerman, an unapportioned tax on wealth is permissible because several constitutional "moments" have occurred over the years that have
rendered original understanding irrelevant. See Ackerman,
supra note 24, at 56-58.
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ment rule: 89 "Given its rapid expansion, 'excise' should
be understood as a malleable concept that a [c]ourt can
use to avoid apportionment. ... '[I]ncome,' too, is a
malleable concept that a court can use to avoid apportionment."90 With Johnson's help, a judge's job is really,
really easy: Every national levy is an "excise/' a "tax

on incomes;" or maybe both- with no apportionment
therefore required.
I understand the appeal of legal realism as a description of what some judges do; I reject it as a model of
desirable judicial behavior. Surely we can come up
with a more principled approach to constitutional interpretation than "manipulative expansion."
.

89

Johnson, supra note 1, at 1734.
Id. at 1733.

90
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Johnson's response begins on the next page.
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JENSEN'S RESPONSE TO JOHNSON'S RESPONSE TO JENSEN'S RESPONSE TO
JOHNSON'S RESPONSE TO JENSEN (OR IS IT THE OTHER WAY AROUND?)
By Erik M. Jensen
Professor Johnson and I aren't converging on this
issue, and perhaps we never will. We're spinning our
wheels, regurgitating the same material, and (obviously) mixing, as well as piling on, metaphors.
Now I'm accused of being "ahistorical" and doing
the equivalent of "burying Barbie dolls at an archeological site and then pretending [I] have discovered something profound." I guess that's supposed
to mean I made a lot up and didn't fool anyone in doing
so. Gosh, I thought my "forgeries" were good enough
to be likened to Piltdown man, rather than ArcheologicalArtifact Barbie. Oh, well.
To my mind, while Professor Johnson has been sifting sand looking for potsherds, he's missed the
Pyramids. 1 Johnson and I have such different conceptions of what was going on in 1787 that we're like two
ships passing in the ... well, you know. It's probably
because of a defect in my upbringing, but I don't understand how anyone can seriously suggest that the directtax apportionment rule wasn't intended to hobble the
national taxing power. You can say that the rule is
extremely clumsy (and I'd agree). You can come up
with hypotheticals for which the rule doesn't work
well. And you can argue, as many do (but Johnson
doesn't), that original understanding should be irrelevant in constitutional interpretation. But the apportionment rule wasn't intended to be a hobble? I don't
begin to see it.
Nor do I understand how Professor Johnson can
expect us to believe that "[n]o proponent of this Constitution could have tolerated a hobble on federal revenue." Johnson has let his characterization of the Constitution as a "pro-tax" document careen totally out of
control. Yes, "tax won" in the fight over the Constitution, but you can't read the constitutional debates
without realizing that an awful lot of Founders, including Federalists, were insisting on restraints that
Johnson says were intolerable. Of course the Founders
wanted the national government to have the power to
tax - everyone agrees on that proposition - but they
were also very nervous about that power. The constitutional context, Professor Owen Fiss has properly noted,
was "defined by the desire to prevent abuses of the
power of taxation." 2 Without constraints on the national taxing power, there would have been no Constitution.
Compared to the Articles of Confederation, which
gave the national government no power whatsoever to
levy taxes on individuals, the 1787 Constitution was

1
0r he's been looking for Trojan artifacts in King Tut's
tomb.
2
0wen M. Fiss, History of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910, at
88-89 (1993).
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decidedly "pro-tax." But that label (and that's all it is)
provides no justification for ignoring the specific limitations on the taxing power included in the very same
document - the Uniformity Clause and the Export
Clause as well as the Direct-Tax Clauses. (Actually
Professor Johnson isn't asking us to ignore the Uniformity and Export Clauses, but why not, if "[n]o
proponent of this Constitution could have tolerated a
hobble on federal revenue"?)
And "hobble" (which was Professor Johnson's word
to begin with) doesn't mean "kill," at least not with the
Direct-Tax Clauses. It's just not true that "what is left,"
after I have interpreted my Barbie dolls, "is an apportionment clause that is just a tax killer." Sure, if a congressman were to propose a direct tax that would have
decidedly sectional effects, the apportionment requirement would probably doom that proposal, and a good
thing too. But when Congress is willing to accept the
negatives associated with apportionment of a particular tax- when the need for revenue becomes great
enough to overcome apportionment's cumbersomeness and when the sectional effects will be acceptably
small- Congress can enact apportioned direct taxes. 3
Lest this basic point be lost in the mass of shockand-awe verbiage, let me reemphasize that Congress
did in fact enact a number of apportioned taxes on real
estate between 1798 and 1861. 4 It's hard to make apportionment work, but, despite Professor Johnson's hyperbole, apportioning a direct tax can be done and it
has been done. That's not a planted Barbie doll; it's an
incontrovertible fact.
The Constitution (and, for that matter, the Internal
Revenue Code) ought to be interpreted using a standard of reasonableness. We should try to interpret even
the most difficult provision in a way that makes as
much sense as possible, and it's ordinarily not a sensible result to interpret a provision as meaningless. If
your reasoning leads you to conclude that Congress
can avoid apportioning a tax on the ownership of real
estate, slaves, or dogsleds simply by labeling the levy
an "excise" - and, like Professor Johnson, you conclude that the Founders intended to bless such a subterfuge - the appropriate response is to reconsider the
premises that led to that bizarre result, not to celebrate
it.

3

In a couple of places Professor Johnson characterizes me
as interpreting the Direct-Tax Clauses to require that direct
taxes be applied only to tax bases that are distributed in a
reasonably uniform way across the country. Not quite right. I
said that the system creates a powerful incentive for Congress
to impose direct taxes in such a way. But if the apportionment
rule is satisfied, Congress has the power to impose a direct
tax on other items.
4
See note 77 in my article for the cites.
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I've defended my understanding of indirect taxation
("Duties, Imposts and Excises") in other places, with
copious citations to founding-era sources that noted
the relative safety of those levies compared to direct
taxes. I'm sure I didn't get everything precisely right
- if absolute precision is even possible on issues like
these -but I haven't simply made it all up. And my
understanding has reason behind it.
In contrast, Professor Johnson stretches reasonable
points out of shape to make debaters' points. For example, he denigrates the idea of "avoidability" as the
basis for distinguishing between indirect and direct
taxes - indirect taxes on the transfer of goods are
avoidable by not buying the taxed goods, direct taxes
aren't similarly avoidable- because, he argues, almost
any tax can in fact be avoided. You can avoid a tax on
real estate, which was thought to be the quintessential
direct tax, by not owning real estate; you can avoid an
income tax by not having income (or, Johnson says, by
"renouncing all earthly possessions"), etc. If any tax is
avoidable in these ways, he suggests, the direct-indirect distinction breaks down.
Come on. I'm surprised Professor Johnson didn't
suggest that a capitation tax can be avoided by committing suicide. Let's return to planet Earth. The
Founders thought that the difficulty of avoiding a tax
on owning real estate or on one's own head was of a
different order from the difficulty involved in avoiding
a tax on the purchase of a bottle of whiskey. If the
distinction isn't as precise as Professor Johnson might
like, so be it, but that doesn't mean that no distinction
exists, or that no distinction existed in the minds of the
Founders. And distinctions don't become meaningless
just because hard categorization cases inevitably arise
at the margin.
I can challenge lots of other points in Professor
Johnson's article, but enough is enough, except for a
coupl~ of final points about constitutional interpretation. Point number one: Johnson characterizes me as
"wanting" to kill one sort of tax or another. He thereby
conflates, as the man on the street does, questions of
constitutionality and desirability. This isn't, or
shouldn't be, a debate about the most desirable forms
of taxation. Really. I began my research on the meaning
of the tax clauses in the Constitution because I was
curious. Folks who were proposing new taxes simply
assumed that Congress could do as it wished, and that
struck me as a suspect proposition. (It still does.) I
knew there were constitutional provisions that, in
form, seemed to limit the congressional power. I
wanted .to understand those provisions as well as I
could, even if they might constrain forms of taxation
that - all other things being equal - I would prefer.
In any event, if there's a potential problem with a
proposed tax, it's better to know ahead of time than to
have to clean the mess up afterwards.
For example, whether I think Congress ought to be
able to tax "Articles exported" or not - and all of the
most prominent Federalists at the Constitutional Convention thought Congress should have that power Congress can't do it. Period. If I describe the Export
Clause in Article I, section 9 as having that effect, I'm
not necessarily endorsing the description. If I were a
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proponent of export taxation, I could argue that the
Export Clause was a bad idea to begin with, that it
ought to be applied today in only the most obvious
situations, and that it ought to be eventually repealed.
But the Export Clause can't be ignored just because it's
inconvenient, and any reasonable policymaker ought
to want to know about the dangers of going ahead with
an overly aggressive interpretation of what Congress
can do. 5
Interpretive point number two: Maybe this original
understanding stuff is just irrelevant today, but, if it's
not, we need to raise questions about what the
Founders might have thought, or should have thought,
or would have thought. If we're evaluating a form of
taxation that wasn't known to the Founders, we have
to think about how the Founders (and, depending on
the type of tax, maybe the ratifiers of the 16th Amendment as well) would have evaluated that form, applying the principles the Founders enunciated. Professor
Johnson ridicules this woulda-shoulda-mighta process,
but I can't imagine any form of interpretation more
mindless than one that purports to accept the importance of original understanding, but then doesn't raise
those questions. Would Professor Johnson really have
us conclude that the Fourth Amendment has no
relevance to electronic surveillance just because his
giants didn't talk about it? 6
The question before the ratification of the 16th
Amendment wasn't whether the Founders discussed
personal income taxation - of course they didn'tbut how the principles they enunciated would have
applied to an income tax. Professor Johnson's conclusion that a limitation on the taxing power should
apply only to forms of taxation known in 1787 (and
therefore can't apply to an income tax, say) makes the
Constitution a joke.
Oh, yeah. One other thing that gets lost in the heated
discussion: The 16th Amendment made an unapportioned "tax on incomes" possible. Whatever the meaning of "direct taxes," whatever the intentions of the
Founders about the desirability of direct taxation,
whatever the proper understanding of Pollock, Congress can enact an unapportioned income tax. We still

5

In the 1990s, after a long hiatus, the Supreme Court suddenly remembered how to strike down taxing statutes on
constitutional grounds, in two cases involving the Export
Clause. See United States v. International Business Machines
Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996); United States v. United States Shoe
Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998). No longer should Congress be
oblivious to constitutional constraints.
6
With taxes known to the founders, we shouldn't need to
engage in such an inquiry. For example, we know for sure
that the Founders thought that a tax on real estate was direct.
It's more than a little bewildering that in this case, where
there is absolutely no doubt, Professor Johnson applies his
own version of a "shoulda analysis" to conclude that the
founders wouldn't have considered real-estate taxes to be
direct had they only thought the problem through in a
Johnsonian way.
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need to figure out what a "tax on incomes" is for constitutional purposes, and I've concluded that the term
doesn't include a wealth tax or a direct-consumption
tax. But, regardless of what "taxes on incomes" means,
the term is very broad. In trying to understand the
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limits on the taxing power, I'm not arguing that the
Constitution requires an impotent national revenue
system. So, even if I'm right about everything, Calvin
- and of course I am - you don't need to throw out
(most of) your class notes for Federal Income Taxation.
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